Foreign competition, domestic competition and innovation in Chinese private high-tech new ventures by Tianjiao Xia (1250577) & Xiaohui Liu (1254282)
 1 
 
Foreign competition, domestic competition and innovation in Chinese 
private high-tech new ventures 
 
 
 
Tianjiao Xia 
 
School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK. 
Email: T.Xia@lboro.ac.uk 
 
 
 
Xiaohui Liu1 
 
1. School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK. 
 
2. School of International Business, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, 
Chengdu, China 
X.Liu2@lboro.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author. 
 2 
 
 Foreign competition, domestic competition and innovation in Chinese 
private high-tech new ventures   
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Competition plays an important role in creating conditions favourable to innovation. However, is this 
the case for all types of competition? While recognizing the importance of competition in innovation, 
we address this question by examining the impact of foreign and domestic competition on the 
innovation performance of private high-tech new ventures.  We argue that the impact of foreign and 
domestic competition on the innovation performance of local private firms may vary, due to the 
different types of resource interdependence with their competitors and learning gained by private 
firms. To test these arguments, we conducted a multilevel analysis of 805 Chinese private high-tech 
firms over the period 2001-2007. Our findings suggest that foreign competition has a U-shaped 
relationship with the innovation performance of private firms, whereas competition from state-owned 
enterprises positively affects private firms’ innovation performance. Our study moves beyond the 
debate on whether competition increases or decreases innovation by unpacking the differential effects 
exerted by different types of competitors on the innovation performance of local private firms in the 
context of a transition economy. 
 
Keywords:  resource dependence theory; foreign competition; SOE competition; innovation; 
multilevel analysis  
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INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between competition and innovation has long been a centre of academic attention in 
economics literature and in the international business (IB) field. Existing research in economics 
literature is mainly built on two traditional views: the ‘Schumpeterian effect of competition’ which 
emphasizes that increased competition discourages innovation, and the ‘escape competition effect’ 
with a stress on the innovation-enhancing effect of competition. Empirical findings are mixed, with 
some studies reporting a positive impact of competition on innovation (Carlin et al., 2004; Nickell, 
1996), while others finding a negative association (Blundell et al. 1999; Hinloopen & 
Vandekerckhove, 2009; Tang, 2006). These studies examine competition based on industry 
characteristics without taking account of the institutional setting of a country, which may underpin 
new mechanisms for the well-observed relationship between competition and innovation. For 
instance, unlike the free market competition in most advanced economies, a historically more 
coordinated market policy in transition economies such as China often shields companies, such as 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), from competition. Moreover, existing research has mainly focused on 
examining the relationship between competition and the innovation performance of large incumbent 
firms (Chang & Xu, 2008; Gorodnichenko et al., 2010; Sutton, 2007; Un, 2016). Our understanding of 
how private high-tech new ventures (HTNVs) in a transition economy, such as China, strive to 
innovate in order to compete against their rivals, and succeed in the innovation contest, remains rather 
limited, given their strong survivability and resilience to change (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2011). Thus, 
the relationship between competition and innovation has yet to be systematically examined in 
transition economy contexts. 
While the economic literature does not explicitly differentiate between foreign and domestic 
competition, existing research on the spillover effect of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the IB 
literature has recognized the impact of foreign firms from developed countries on productivity and the 
performance of local firms in developing host countries, and has identified four main channels 
through which foreign firms affect local firms’ productivity and technology upgrading: 
demonstration, competition, linkages and employee mobility (Liu & Buck 2007; Perri & Peruffo, 
2016; Wei & Liu, 2006). This stream of research is built on the notion that advanced technologies and 
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modern management practices possessed by foreign firms can be learned or imitated by local firms, 
thereby enhancing their productivity and technology upgrading (Caves, 1974; Hymer, 1960; 
Belderbos et al., 2015). However, empirical evidence on the spillover effect of FDI is mixed. Some 
studies have found a positive FDI spillover effect on domestic firms (Tian, 2007; Wei &Liu, 2006; 
Zhang et al., 2014), whereas others have shown no evidence, or even a negative association between 
the presence of foreign firms and local firms’ productivity (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Feinberg & 
Majumdar, 2001; Haddad & Harrison, 1993).  
The lack of sound reconciliation for these contradictory findings underlies two important gaps 
in the existing literature. First, most IB studies consider domestic firms as homogenous entities 
without taking into account different types of ownership. This may be problematic, given that 
variations in ownership type may create heterogeneity in firms’ resource profiles and their strategic 
actions taken to alleviate external resource constraints. Second, the common outcome examined by 
these IB studies is firm performance in general. However, domestic firms’ innovation, in particular 
the spillover effect of foreign competition on local firms’ innovation, has not yet been thoroughly 
explored. Little attention has been paid to the role of SOEs in encouraging indigenous innovation, 
which may substantially decrease local firms’ dependence on foreign technologies in countries such 
as China (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2011).  
Our study is motivated by the need to address these gaps by differentiating the source of 
competition based on a multilevel analysis. Closing these gaps is of particular importance as doing so 
may evoke some new theoretical mechanisms that affect the known mechanisms that drive the 
competition-innovation relationship, in addition to its contribution to reconciling the inconsistent 
findings on competition and innovation. To unpack what lies behind different sources of competition 
and to better understand the relationship between competition and innovation in the context of a 
transition economy, we examine the extent to which different types of competition (foreign firms and 
SOEs) affect the innovation performance of private HTNVs. Adopting a resource dependence 
perspective, we distinguish between private HTNV-foreign firm interdependence through resource 
exchange and private HTNV-SOE interdependence through state ownership. We develop resource 
dependence logic of learning and innovation to differentiate private firms’ strategic actions through 
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which they can alter the patterns of these different forms of interdependencies with competitors. 
According to such logics, the entry of foreign rivals reduces the overall profit margins of incumbent 
firms, thereby diminishing or eliminating the level of slack resources that can be used by private firms 
for innovation (Inkpen & Beamish, 1997). However, private firms are able to survive by minimizing 
their downside loss in market share through learning from and imitating their foreign counterparts 
(Wei et al., 2008). Thus, we argue that up to a certain level of foreign competition, the negative 
impact of foreign competition on innovation prevails because of the dominance of the resource 
dependence logic of learning. Beyond this threshold point, the resource dependence logic of 
innovation becomes prevalent, as private firms face the paradox of imitation choices and increasing 
learning costs. Therefore, the innovation-enhancing effect of foreign competition may overwhelm its 
negative effect. By contrast, we propose that the resource dependence logic of innovation will prevail 
in the face of SOE competition, as private firms can alleviate their resource dependence on SOEs and 
increase their relative power through a variety of innovation activities (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002). 
This innovation-enhancing effect is more likely to hold at high levels of SOE competition because of 
the existence of the innovation sunk costs and the survival priorities of private firms (Park et al., 2006; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
We test these predictions using detailed data on foreign competition, SOE competition and the 
innovation performance of Chinese private HTNVs during the period 2001-2007.  Our empirical 
results support our predictions and reveal fundamental differences between foreign and SOE 
competition with regard to their implications for the innovation performance of private HTNVs. We 
find a curvilinear U-shaped relationship between foreign competition and private HTNVs’ innovation 
performance, and a positive relationship between SOE competition and private HTNVs’ innovation 
performance.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature on IB, competition and innovation, as well as 
resource dependence theory, in several ways. First, our study advances a context–based refinement of 
FDI spillovers by exclusively examining the impact of foreign competition on Chinese private 
HTNVs. We add a new dimension on FDI spillovers by articulating and distinguishing the 
‘competition effect’ of FDI on private HTNVs innovation performance. Second, we offer an 
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alternative theoretical rationale, supported by empirical evidence, for a more complex link between 
competition and innovation. Based on the resource dependency theory, we are able to specify the 
impact of different sources of competition on the innovation performance of private HTNVs by 
exploring their distinct resource interdependencies with each type of competitor.  Finally, our study 
provides a refinement of resource dependence theory. We consider the government as a source of 
external dependence for SOEs and thus move beyond the dyadic interdependence between SOEs and 
private firms by examining the ‘multiplexity’ of their resource dependency relationships (Hillman et 
al., 2011). 
 
 
 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Theoretical Background: Resource Dependence Theory  
The resource dependence theory considers external resource interdependencies as a key determinant 
of firms’ behaviour in their resource exchange with other firms. According to this theory, 
organizations are both supported and constrained by their external environment and act to attempt to 
manage resource dependencies and counteract the power of key resource holders (Garud et al., 2002; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003: xxxiii). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 40) defined interdependence as a 
phenomenon that ‘exists whenever one actor does not entirely control all of the conditions necessary 
for the achievement of an action or for obtaining the outcome desired from the action’. Such 
interdependencies are typically exemplified through two essential elements – mutual dependence, 
which represents the total dependencies between two actors, and power imbalance, which captures the 
difference between dependencies (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Emerson, 1962; Gulati & Sytch, 
2007). Depending on the conditions of the external control of organizations, they can implement 
interorganizational arrangements, such as alliances and joint ventures, to comply with their external 
constraints, or even attempt to avoid or influence the constraints through inter-organizational links 
that help increase mutual dependence and reduce power imbalances between the focal firm and those 
parties in its environment on whom it depends for critical resources (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
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The resource dependence theory provides a solid rationale for understanding not only 
collaboration but also competition among firms. The emphasis on power gained through a firm’s 
external control of resources suggests that the competitiveness of a firm can be derived from its 
relative power over others. The extent to which a firm can escape and/or adapt to external constraints 
resulting from competition is determined by the ability to simultaneously reduce its resource 
dependence while cultivating that of competitors in order to increase competitive power in an 
effective and efficient manner (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). This may influence the pattern of 
competitive rivalry in several ways.  
 
The Resource Dependence Logic of Learning  
First and foremost, a firm can seek alternative resources by taking strategic actions to prevent its 
dependence concentration and increase its relative power. Learning as an adaptation strategy allows 
the firm to cope with external constraints by decreasing its dependence on its rivals (Peng & Beamish, 
2014). If a firm and its competitors are mutually dependent but the firm has less power over its 
competitors, learning to acquire and develop the rivals’ resources enables the firm to minimize the 
influence of its dependence on the competitors and counterbalance their power in the long run. This 
can effectively tip the balance of power in the focal firm’s favour (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  
 
The Resource Dependence Logic of Innovation 
Second, a firm can innovate to overcome or avoid external constraints, thereby altering the patterns of 
mutual dependence. If the critical and scarce resources required by the firm are non-substitutable, or 
the replacement of these resources proves costly, it can alleviate its dependence on such resources by 
enhancing the efficiency of its resource usage, and/or diversifying through innovation into other 
markets where the firm is not constrained by the dominant players in its current market (Pfeffer, 1972; 
1976). In addition, a firm can cultivate and strengthen its competitors’ dependence in their resource 
exchange relationships in order to increase its relative power, by introducing new disruptive 
technologies through innovation (Christensen & Bower, 1996). However, such resource dependence 
is temporary, as competitors will eventually absorb the technologies and retaliate with more advanced 
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innovation (Lado et al., 2006; Christensen et al., 2008). This situation often occurs when the critical 
and scarce resources needed by the firm are intangible and cost less to be replicated elsewhere. A co-
operation strategy is typically adopted to gain access to partners’ critical resources, before the firm is 
able to break away and become a competitor (Jorde & Teece, 1989). It is worth noting that the above 
mentioned competitive actions and responses have to be tied to market demand, since customers 
provide the ultimate resources the firm needs to survive (Christensen & Bower, 1996).  
Based on the resource dependence logics of learning and innovation, we attempt to explain 
heterogeneity in the effects of foreign and SOE competition on private firms’ innovation performance. 
We do this by considering different forms of resource interdependence and the strategic actions 
private new ventures take to reduce their resource dependence and power imbalance. We argue that 
Chinese private new ventures are able to reduce their dependence on foreign rivals through learning 
and imitating their advanced technologies and managerial skills, and to increase their relative power 
in the resource exchange through innovation (Buckley et al., 2002; Yip & McKern, 2016; Zhang et 
al., 2010). Equally, by capitalizing on emerging technology areas that are out of the focus of SOEs, 
private new ventures effectively reduce the constraints associated with dependence on SOEs in the 
current market segment, and thus increase their relative power (Tan & Peng, 2003).  
 
Limitations of the Resource Dependence Logic of Learning:  The Learning Cost 
The resource dependence logic of learning, based on maintaining the control of critical resources, 
overlooks the strategic priorities of firms associated with the potential cost and risk of shaping the 
patterns of resource interdependence in their own favour. In particular, learning based rationales 
overstress the learning benefits private firms have which, after a certain level of foreign competition, 
may diminish because the cost and risk of maintaining such interdependent relationships based on 
resource exchange may increase faster than the benefits, and so threaten their survival.  
 The cost of learning will increase as certain advanced resources are often context or country 
specific, and can only be leveraged on a global basis. This makes it more difficult and resource 
intensive to absorb these resources. The lack of commonality in the prior knowledge base of 
companies engenders distortion and loss of information when private firms attempt to decode, 
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interpret and ultimately assimilate the advanced knowledge of foreign rivals. Moreover, the greater 
the number of foreign firms, the higher the level of diversity of advanced critical resources private 
firms need to take into account. The path dependent nature of learning suggests that prior knowledge 
is essential to a firm’s ability to absorb new knowledge (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). As private firms 
acquire knowledge from sources farther afield, it is less likely they will possess the prior knowledge 
necessary to fully comprehend and appropriately value the discoveries, leading to missed 
opportunities. This is due to the limitations firms experience with achieving sufficient knowledge 
diversity to value all possible discoveries (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). Thus at high levels of foreign 
competition, the learning effect diminishes as a result of the prior knowledge limitations of private 
firms, making it harder for them to survive on imitation activities.  
 
Characteristics of Chinese Private High-Tech New Ventures 
Here we consider learning as a key characteristic or strategic action of Chinese private HTNVs in 
their attempt to reduce mutual dependence and counterbalance the power of foreign entrants. To adapt 
to the dynamic environment caused by the entry of foreign firms, private new ventures are compelled 
to utilize their learning capability to tap into the new knowledge, and develop competencies they do 
not currently possess. This is mainly due to the fact that most local firms lag behind their foreign 
counterparts (Fuller, 2006; Liu et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2010). It is very unlikely that leveraging 
existing knowledge and competence will help these firms adapt to the competitive pressure and 
withstand the threat from foreign firms. However, private firms may create value through replicating 
foreign rivals’ advanced technology quickly and more cheaply. There are several ways in which 
private firms can catch up with their foreign rivals in innovation through learning. 
First, private firms may be motivated to learn from foreign firms by imitation (Buckley et al., 
2002; Zhang et al., 2010). In this case, advanced technologies and new products brought by foreign 
firms might serve as a learning platform for private new ventures1. These firms are more likely to 
follow a trajectory from duplicative imitation of technological knowledge to creative imitation of 
technological competence in order to move up the ladder of innovation (Boulding & Christen, 2001; 
Park & Bae, 2004; Yip & McKern, 2016; Zhou, 2006). Noteworthy is that for private firms, the 
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ultimate goal is to emulate the technological capabilities of foreign rivals, and improve their own 
absorptive capacity, which has long-term value to their innovation, rather than to replicate the existing 
knowledge/technologies of foreign counterparts, which may become obsolete rapidly (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1989)2. Thus, the presence of foreign entrants can stimulate local new ventures’ innovative 
activities through creative imitation or by reverse engineering the outputs of foreign firms’ R&D 
projects (Collinson, 2013; Liu & Buck, 2007; Wei et al., 2008; Xie & Wu, 2003). 
Second, private firms may seek to minimize the threat of foreign rivals by collaborating with 
their foreign competitors and/or becoming their local contractors, which represents an opportunity for 
local private firms to innovate through vicarious learning (Gnyawali & Park, 2009; Tomlinson & 
Jackson, 2013; Zhao et al., 2005; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015)3. Private firms may gain the 
necessary skills and capabilities for innovation and a better appreciation of its commercial benefits 
through direct interaction with foreign pioneers, and through observing and evaluating their 
innovation effort and outputs (Groenendijk et al., 2013)4.  
 
Hypotheses 
Foreign Competition 
The degree of foreign competition in a domestic firm’s focal market is likely to influence its 
innovation performance. The presence of foreign firms is more likely to increase competitive rivalry 
since foreign firms possess both country and firm-specific capabilities that differ not only 
substantially from those of domestic firms, but are also critical to their operations (Kogut & Zander, 
1995; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008). Thus an increase in the number of foreign firms in the domestic 
market boosts the overall competitive level and drives down the average profit margins, which 
significantly reduces or eliminates the slack resources available for private HTNVs to reinvest in 
innovation. .      
 Low levels of foreign competition. Instead of establishing a full and extensive business 
network in each country they enter, foreign firms may collaborate with local suppliers and distributors 
(Barlett et al., 2013; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015; Zhou et al., 2007), and exchange critical 
complementary resources with their local partners. Foreign entrants rely on private HTNVs for local 
 11 
 
knowledge and resources, to overcome their liability of foreignness and to reduce transportation and 
distribution costs, as well as potential local competition (Chang & Xu, 2008; Nachum, 2010). Private 
firms depend on foreign firms for advanced resources, such as advanced technologies and business 
models. This type of exchange relationship creates a power imbalance which favours foreign firms, 
whose control over important advanced resources gives their products a quality advantage that can be 
translated into higher profits through either charging a higher price or capturing a larger market share 
(Chang & Park, 2012; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015). The greater bargaining power of foreign firms 
is more likely to be sustained up to a certain level of foreign competition, because private firms 
possess neither the capability nor the slack resources to develop these critical advanced resources 
internally within a short period of time, and the cost of access to alternative resources is similar. To 
balance foreign firms’ power advantage and reduce their resource dependence, private firms may seek 
to exploit potential opportunities for learning through close monitoring, and then imitating the 
activities of rivals or partners. Empirical research shows that many Chinese private high-tech 
companies have gained access to the advanced technologies of their foreign counterparts through 
close interaction with them via the formal and informal meetings held as part of their joint R&D 
projects (Wei et al., 2008; Zhao et al., 2005). These firms are then able to effectively compete with 
their foreign rivals by imitating their advanced technologies after making small product and process 
improvements (Dobson & Safarian, 2008; Tsang, 2002; Yip & McKern, 2016). Specifically, by 
imitating at a low cost, private firms effectively transfer the sunk cost of innovation to their foreign 
counterparts, and by operating domestically they avoid any additional costs incurred by foreign 
operations (Dobson & Safarian, 2008; Engels & Hunt, 2010).  
However, given that imitation is beneficial for private firms at low levels of foreign 
competition, which effectively alleviates their resource dependence on their foreign counterparts, the 
motivation of innovation is more likely to override that of imitation for several reasons. First, the 
presence of a limited number of foreign rivals in the domestic market makes it harder for these firms 
to find an appropriate foreign firm to imitate, thereby discouraging their imitation activity. Second, to 
reduce or eliminate the constraints on access to, and choice of, foreign knowledge, our theoretical 
development suggests that private firms are more likely to avoid the learning-based interdependence 
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with foreign firms through innovation. This effect, however, only holds when there are a fairly small 
number of foreign players in the domestic market and before they capture a large market share 
(Spencer, 2008), because although the overall sales of private firms may decrease as a result of 
foreign competition, their profit margins are sufficient to maintain their survival. 
Moderate levels of foreign competition. Increasing competition from more advanced foreign 
products leads to diminishing demand for existing products, leaving private firms with a reduced 
profit margin and no slack to invest in innovation (Barringer & Ireland, 2010; Brock & Scheinkman, 
1985). The incentives of imitation – generating slack resources and maintaining control of critical 
resources – as discussed above, are more likely to overwhelm those of innovation. For private new 
ventures with a higher risk of being crowded out of the market due to potential losses in market share, 
imitation is more beneficial and feasible than innovation at moderate levels of foreign competition. 
They can survive with their earnings from imitation (Yip & McKern, 2016). It costs less to imitate, 
although the imitative products cannot be sold at a higher price than those of the foreign pioneers, as 
they are new to private firms but not to the market, in particular when buyers’ switching costs for their 
products are fully exploited. It is easier for private firms to pick the most appropriate knowledge that 
fits well with their capabilities to imitate at this level than at the lower levels of foreign competition 
where there is too little foreign knowledge to choose from (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000). By contrast, 
innovation is inherently risky at this level, in particular before private firms can accumulate a 
sufficient level of capability and slack from their imitation sales to innovate and shoulder the risk. 
Moreover, access to external funding for start-up innovation is rather limited in transitional 
economies, such as China, compared to those in advanced economies (Ahlstrom & Bruton, 2006; 
Bruton et al., 2008). Thus, picking lower hanging fruit is a less risky and more effective strategy to 
ensure their short-term viability.  
Higher levels of foreign competition. There are at least two rationales, based on the pressures 
to innovate arising from the increasing costs of learning or imitation, which support the notion of a 
curvilinear (U-shaped) relationship. In the first rationale, the pressure to innovate increases when 
there is a high concentration of foreign firms in the market, and the reduced overall sales of private 
firms are not covering their costs (Spencer, 2008). The presence of a substantial number of foreign 
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rivals not only considerably increases the total number of firms in the high-tech industries, resulting in 
a crowded domestic market, but also leads to a high level of market fragmentation (Katila & Shane, 
2005). Facing too many attractive options to choose from may ultimately increase the cost of 
imitation, since private firms have to spend a considerable amount of time and resources screening, 
identifying and assessing foreign knowledge or technologies that they may decide not to imitate. In 
addition, a highly fragmented market raises the demand for greater diversity in product offerings, 
which encourages private firms to innovate (Katila & Shane, 2005; Moorman & Miner, 1998). This 
implies that imitation becomes  a less valuable option for private firms to follow than innovation at 
this stage, as the profit margins for imitated products are disappearing (Mourdoukoutas, 2015). To 
survive, they have to fight back to regain their lost market share through innovation. The second 
pressure to innovate in our second rationale is that the cost of learning will escalate up to a point 
where the priority of reducing the cost and risk associated with learning overrides the priority of 
acquiring critical resources through learning from foreign counterparts (Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000; 
Leiponen & Helfat, 2010; Szulanski, 1996). Meanwhile, for foreign rivals, imitation effectively cuts 
into their earnings. To regain their powerful position in the relationship with private firms, and restore 
their profitability and market shares, foreign firms are more likely to increase their control of the 
critical advanced resources required by private firms through importing new technologies that may be 
rooted in their unique organisational and local environments, which makes them more complex, firm-
specific and difficult to duplicate elsewhere (Barney, 2001; Brandt & Thun, 2010; Gorodnichenkoet 
al., 2010).  
In summary, we argue that at lower and higher levels of foreign competition, the innovation 
enhancing effect of foreign competition is more pronounced due to the dominance of the resource 
dependence logic of learning and innovation. In particular, the learning cost associated with imitation 
at high levels of foreign competition is expected to overtake its financial returns, whereas the benefits 
of pursuing innovation override its potential risk. By contrast, we anticipate that at moderate levels of 
foreign competition, its negative effect overwhelms its positive effect on private firms’ innovation 
performance as the resource dependence logic of learning tends to govern the interaction between 
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foreign and private firms, such that the strength of learning overrides that of competing for innovation 
by private firms.  Thus, we propose:  
 
Hypothesis 1: The relationship between foreign competition and the innovation performance of 
Chinese private high-tech new ventures is a curvilinear (a U-shaped) function, with innovation 
performance decreasing at a moderate level of foreign competition and increasing at a high 
level of foreign competition. 
 
Competition from SOEs 
Although private HTNVs face competitive pressure from both SOEs and foreign firms, the impact of 
SOE competition on their innovation performance may vary from that of foreign competition due to 
SOEs’ special relationship with the government, resulting in a differing form of resource 
interdependence compared with foreign firms. SOEs are treated as both economic entities and 
government units in China. They are embedded in a strong and extensive bureaucratic network as the 
managers of SOEs are often former party members or governmental officials (Chang & Xu, 2008; Xu 
& Zhang, 2008). Their political status and political connections enable SOEs to gain preferential 
treatment in terms of resources, contracts and subsidies (Nee & Matthews, 1996; Tian & Estrin, 
2008). Thus, the competition between SOEs and domestic private firms is influenced by government 
intervention and is less market-driven (Mueller et al., 2013).  
SOEs have monopolies over restricted state-controlled resources, such as land and oil, that are 
essential for both foreign and domestic competitors to maintain their local operations. The financial 
system heavily favours SOEs as they are not directly subject to the scrutiny of the capital market, 
resulting in SOEs’ soft budgets (Bai et al., 2006; Lin & Tan, 1999).  For example, in return for 
guaranteed profits and state backing, official banks lend to SOEs at a third of the cost of credit 
available to private companies (Brandt & Li, 2003; The Economist, 2012). The resource profile of 
SOEs as a special government unit has several implications for their resource interdependence with 
private firms, which is different from that of foreign entrants.  First, unlike foreign firms with 
‘temporary’ control of advance resources which private firms need, SOEs ‘always’ pre-empt the 
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critical scarce resources required for private firms’ innovation activities, in particular those 
‘irreplaceable’ strategic resources controlled by the state, such as transportation as part of a firm’s 
distribution network, as well as the water and electricity that are necessary for local operations. Thus 
the bargaining power of SOEs over private firms is unlikely to be altered unless private firms cultivate 
SOEs’ dependence by controlling those critical resources required by the SOEs. SOEs typically sell 
the right to use scarce resources to their rivals at a high price to ensure the price competitiveness of 
their own products. To sustain their survival, private HTNVs have to pay dearly for those resources, 
since there is hardly any alternative to such resources available. This suggests a persistently linear 
effect of SOE competition on private firms’ innovation performance. Second, the level of mutual 
dependence of SOEs and private firms is much lower than that of foreign firms and private firms, 
because the critical resources required by foreign firms and private new ventures, such as local 
knowledge and advanced technologies and managerial expertise, can be acquired through learning 
from each other (Xia et al., 2013; Yip & McKern, 2016; Zhang et al., 2010). Thus, their relative 
power advantage established through mutual dependence is more likely to be balanced. In contrast, 
SOEs rely on the government instead of private new ventures for critical resources. The governments 
in transitional economies such as China often possess significant strategic resources and usually serve 
as an important source of resources for SOEs (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Ma & Delios, 2010). Private 
new ventures in China are typically resource constrained, and funding for innovation is rather limited 
as they are discriminated against in China’s credit market, which is based on connections and 
government intervention rather than commercial considerations (Che, 2002; McMillan & Woodruff, 
2002).  
Although their dependence on SOEs for the restricted state resources cannot be replaced or 
minimized, private firms can reduce the cost of using such resources, and/or increase the strength of 
resource exchanges. In doing so, private HTNVs may seek to innovate in order to use their limited 
resources more efficiently, which will give them a cost advantage resulting in a larger profit margin. 
The innate characteristics of private firms, such as agility and adaptability, further enable them to be 
more efficient than SOEs in exploiting the potential commercial returns arising from their innovation 
(Atherton & Smallbone, 2013). The greater efficiency achieved through innovation is more likely to 
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give private firms a higher profit margin than SOEs (Brandt & Thun, 2010), which increases the level 
of slack resources that can be used to re-invest in innovation. The historical inefficiencies in resource 
allocation under the planned economy force SOEs to compete for limited inputs that will enable them 
to meet or exceed production targets, instead of maximizing their financial performance (White, 
2000). Despite the fact that SOEs may dominate certain industries with the support of the government, 
their profit margin remains relatively low because of their diverse range of inefficient manufacturing 
activities (Peng, 2003). Their survival, to a large extent, depends on government subsidies instead of 
market competition (Bai et al., 2006; Hafsi & Koenig, 1988).   
In addition, private firms are able to counterbalance the power of SOEs through the control of 
advanced resources such as innovation. Because of their technical limitations and/or central 
government restrictions, SOEs typically acquire necessary inputs, such as innovation, that they are 
unable to produce, and internalize those inputs that they could produce regardless of obvious 
diseconomies of scale (White, 2000). This effectively provides private firms with the opportunity to 
exchange their innovation for the critical strategic resources necessary for their operations with SOEs, 
thereby enhancing SOEs’ resource dependence on private firms and increasing their relative power 
(Tan & Peng, 2003). 
 According to the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), the likelihood of 
firms using an escape or avoidance strategy increases when they have little control of critical external 
resources. To avoid or escape direct competition with SOEs, private firms may venture into emerging 
technology areas or markets within the same sector, where there is no well-established competitor, 
and the technologies are at an early stage of embryonic development, with a high level of risk and 
uncertainty. This avoidance strategy is feasible as private HTNVs are arguably much nimbler and 
more agile entities compared with SOEs, and thus may learn quickly to innovate in order to serve the 
markets untapped by SOEs (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 2002; Yip & McKern, 2016 )5. SOEs are unwilling 
to capitalize on these risky and unproven technologies, as they are unable to obtain additional capital 
backing and other support from the government, whose main interest and function is to reduce 
uncertainty (North, 1990; Brandt & Thun, 2010). In fact, the government support for SOEs in 
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transitional economies only focuses on the development of low risk technologies, and/or areas with 
low technology uncertainty but high commercial viability (Yamakawa et al., 2008).  
At high levels of SOE competition the incentive for private firms to innovate is more likely to 
hold for several reasons. First, although increased competition from SOEs may reduce the overall 
profit margin of innovative products, the potential significant profit loss that would arise without 
innovating at high levels of SOE competition is more likely to drive a private HTNV into liquidation 
or bankruptcy, compared to the low post-innovating profit which can at least sustain its survival. 
Second, the existence of the sunk cost of innovation may motivate private HTNVs to continuously 
race against SOEs in innovation. Empirical studies find that sunk costs lead to persistence in the 
patterns of Chinese firms’ innovation activity (Wu, 2012; Yi & Wang, 2012; Zhang, 2015). Before the 
innovation, increased SOE competition provided private firms with an incentive to innovate, therefore 
they incurred innovation costs, such as R&D investment, which cannot be recouped once the money 
has been spent regardless of the outcome (Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977; Salop, 1977). However, private 
firms can maximize future gains from their investment in these costs if they surpass SOEs in 
innovation with reasonable profits generated from their innovation projects. Thus, the greater the 
innovation sunk costs are, the more likely it is that private firms decide to complete their innovation 
projects. This rationale is reinforced if abolishing an innovation project proves costly, for instance 
when terminating the innovation project involves displacement of workers. 
The above discussion implies that SOEs dominate the restricted state controlled resources that 
are required by private firms to survive. However, private firms can innovate to reduce their resource 
dependence on SOEs by enhancing the efficiency of their resource usage, and/or capitalizing on 
emerging technologies within the same sector where SOEs are not interested in making any 
investment without government-backing. This innovation incentive of private firms still holds at high 
levels of SOE competition due to the existence of the sunk costs of innovation and the potential 
threats of bankruptcy without innovating. 
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Hypothesis 2: Competition from SOEs is positively associated with the innovation 
performance of private high-tech new ventures in China. 
 
 
METHODS 
Data and Sample  
Our analysis of the impact of foreign and SOE competition on the innovation of private HTNVs in 
China is based on data taken from the Annual Census of Industrial Firms, administered by the Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The dataset covers all domestic and foreign firms operating in 
China with annual sales of at least 5 million RMB (approximately US$676,000). It contains detailed 
information on the key financial indicators, i.e. turnover, R&D, new product development, exporting, 
etc. at both firm and industry levels. The dataset is considered as the most appropriate for the purpose 
of our study for a number of reasons. First, it is the most comprehensive and widely used dataset for 
the study of Chinese firms (e.g. Chang & Xu, 2008; Liu et al., 2009; Pan et al., 1999; Park et al., 
2006). The high degree of accuracy and internal consistency of the data makes this dataset ideal for 
empirical analysis (Chow, 1993). Second, compared to cross-sectional data, the longitudinal census 
data allow us to better capture the dynamic competition and firm innovation activities over time, as 
well as their causal relationships, by applying a multidimensional panel structure (Baltagi, 2008).  
We focus on the 2001-2007 period in particular. Since China joined the WTO in 2001, market 
access for foreign firms has been significantly enhanced with many restrictions on foreign operations 
being lifted. In the meantime, SOEs have gone through major reforms. These structural changes have 
dramatically intensified the competition within the domestic market, evidenced by the growing sales 
of foreign firms and SOEs in the subsequent years (Chang & Xu, 2008; Liu & Buck, 2007). We 
choose 2007 as our cutoff point to exclude the impact of the global financial crisis and policy changes 
(Haveman et al., 2016). The year 2007 saw a tipping point for increased inward FDI activity in China 
before 2008, when the number of foreign firms operating in China plunged dramatically (CCPIT, 
2009). This was due partly to the global financial crisis, which resulted in the bankruptcy of many 
major foreign players at the time, and the introduction of ‘integrated income tax’, which removed the 
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tax incentive for foreign firms for the first time, leading to the exit of some weak foreign players from 
China because of reduced profit margins (Brean, 2008; CCPIT, 2009). Thus, the sample period allows 
us to capture how different types of competitive forces shape the innovation performance of private 
new ventures in the context of economic transition.  
We consider the Chinese high-tech sector as the most appropriate setting for our research, as 
past studies have emphasized the threat and/or importance of foreign entrants on the innovativeness of 
domestic Chinese high-tech firms, given the costly and risky nature of the innovation process in these 
high-tech firms (Pisano, 1990; Wei &Liu, 2006; Zhang et al., 2014). We use the OECD classification 
of the high-tech sector adopted by China, which defines high-tech industries as industries with a 
higher OECD-average direct, indirect and overall R&D intensity (i.e. greater than 9.33%) than those 
in a lower category over the 1980-1990 period (Hatzichronoglou,1997). We focus on domestic private 
HTNVs, defined as Chinese private high-tech firms that are less than 10 years old with fewer than 500 
employees and annual sales of no more than 30 million Chinese RMB in 2001(Zhou et al., 2007), as it 
usually takes 10 years for a high-tech company, in particular a pharmaceutical firm, to bring a new 
drug from discovery to FDA approval – a time horizon that captures the transition from a new venture 
to an established business (Certo et al., 2001; Covin & Slevin, 1990; Shepherd, 1999). According to 
the statistics provided by the China National Bureau of Statistics, around 65 per cent of patent 
applications and about 60 per cent of products that are new in the market are from domestic private 
high-tech start-ups. We reviewed the demographic profile of each firm in the dataset, including 
ownership structure, establishment year, size and standard industry classification code (SIC)6 and 
verified its inclusion in our final sample of domestic private HTNVs. We excluded firms without any 
sales of newly commercialized products over the seven-year period, as these firms either did not 
possess an innovation oriented business model, or stayed dormant for various reasons (Storey & 
Greene, 2010). The resulting dataset comprises 805 small and medium-sized domestic high-tech new 
ventures, with a total of 5,635 observations over a seven-year period. These firms cover four major 
three-digit Chinese standard industrial classification code (SIC) manufacturing industries included in 
the Chinese Statistic Yearbook,  i.e. radio, TV and communications equipment industry (401-3, 405-
9),  the pharmaceutical industry (271-6), the office, accounting and computing machinery industry 
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(404, 415) and the medical, precision and optical instruments industry (368, 411-2, 419, 414). We 
excluded the aircraft and spacecraft industry in which there is little information on foreign and private 
firms due mainly to two reasons. First, the aerospace industry is one of China’s designated strategic 
emerging industries, which restricts non-Chinese ownership and requires the use of joint ventures 
with local firms as the only entry mode for foreign firms. Second, the industry is composed of mostly 
SOEs with a very limited number of private firms. To avoid endogeneity problems and establish 
causal relationships, we lagged all independent variables by one year (t-1). This allowed us to create a 
panel with 4,830 observations (805 X 6) for model estimation.   
 
Dependent Variable 
We measure innovation performance by the NBS’ indicator – percentage of annual sales generated by 
products that are ‘new’ to the market (Cassiman & Veulegers, 2002; He & Wong, 2004). New product 
sales are commonly considered to be an appropriate indicator of the commercial success of a firm’s 
innovation activity (Atuahene-Gima & Li, 2004; Autio et al., 2000). This measure allows us to 
capture the performance dimensions that have been undervalued by other innovation performance 
measurements, such as patent count. Chinese firms have an incentive to record new product sales 
since governmental approval of new products attracts tax subsidies from the provincial or central 
government. In contrast to the standard definition of a new product, which defines it as either a novel 
or an improved product (SSB, 2003), the concept of a new product in this context is more specific - 
the quality and/or function of the existing product should have undergone a significant improvement 
through the adoption of a new structure, material or manufacturing technique.  
 
Independent Variables 
Foreign and SOE competition is measured using the Herfindahl Index (HHI), which is the sum of the 
squares of the market share of total foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) and total SOEs in each high-
tech sector, respectively. The measure is specified as follows: 
Herfindehl Index (HHI) =   +   +   + … +   
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Where  Si  is the market share of ith firm. i = 1, 2, 3, … m. The lower the value of the Herfindahl 
Index, the higher the level of foreign or domestic competition. We used the inverse measure (1/HHI) 
such that a greater value indicates a higher level of foreign or SOE competition (Bowen & Wiersema, 
2005; Zhang et al., 2010).We extracted relevant information on the market share of FIEs and SOEs at 
the industry level from the Chinese Statistic Yearbooks on High-Tech Industries (2001-2007). The 
variables allow us to capture changes in market structure which are reflected in the intensity of each 
type of competition (Acs & Audretsch, 1998; Nickell, 1996). As an alternative measurement, we used 
the concentration ratio to proxy foreign and SOE competition. This is calculated as the sum of the 
market shares of the four largest foreign firms or SOEs within each high-tech sector. This alternative 
measure produced results consistent with those reported in Table 37.  
In addition, we controlled for innovation effort, commercial effort, firm age, size, sector, 
location, export intensity, foreign R&D spillover and capital intensity. A private new venture’s 
innovation effort is operationalized by its R&D intensity, which is defined as R&D expenditure 
relative to total sales. This measure is widely used as a standard measurement for a firm’s innovation 
input (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). We measured a private new venture’s 
commercial effort as annual advertising expenditure divided by sales (Audretsch, 1995; Kotabe et al., 
2002). Engagement with commercialization activities, such as advertising and product promotion, 
allows private firms to better serve the local demand and outperform their competitors in the local 
market. We measured firm age in years and size by number of full-time employees. Small start-up 
firms are usually better at innovation than large established firms due to their behavioural advantage 
(Katila & Shane, 2005).To account for sectoral variations, we included a set of sector dummies which 
take the value of 1 if a private HTNV competes in an industry which belongs to one of the four three-
digit major industries included by the Chinese Statistic Yearbook (i.e. the  radio, TV and 
communications equipment industry,  the pharmaceutical industry, the office, accounting and 
computing machinery industry,  and the medical, precision and optical instrument industry) and 0 
otherwise. We also controlled for location dummies at province level. To further capture the 
locational effect on innovation, we introduced three province-level institutional indexes based on the 
Chinese National Economic Research Institute (NERI)’s marketization indices: the level of local 
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government support for innovation, the development of the market-based economy, and the 
development of the private sector (Fan et al., 2009). Ample empirical evidence from studies on 
economic history suggests that an innovation-friendly environment requires government support in 
many ways (Jones, 2001; North & Thomas, 1997). Private sector is the engine of innovation 
(Nordhaus, 2004). The development of market-based economies increases the level of environmental 
uncertainty, which gives private new ventures an opportunity to disrupt the status quo and destroy the 
competitive advantage of more established firms through innovation (D’Aveni, 1994).  Export 
intensity is operationalized as the total exports to sales ratio at firm level, a standard measure in the 
international business literature. A firm’s innovation could be affected by its linkage with global 
markets (Escribano et al., 2009). The foreign R&D spillover effect is captured by the R&D 
expenditure of foreign firms as a percentage of total sales of an industry (Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; 
Liu & Buck, 2007). Prior studies show that knowledge spillovers between foreign and domestic firms 
can contribute to the productivity and efficiency of domestic firms (Greenaway et al., 2002; Zhang et 
al., 2010). We control for capital intensity by a firm’s fixed asset per employee. It is likely that firms 
with strong capital intensity have relatively higher employee productivity and can innovate faster and 
more efficiently than low capital intensive firms (Deakins & Freel, 2009).  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables used in our analysis. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of our sample firms by industry. We further weighed our 
final sample of private HTNVs in each industry according to their distributions in our original 
sampling frame as Figure 1 illustrates. On average, the sample firms were 7.22 years old with 143 
employees and 19 per cent of their annual sales were generated from commercialized products that are 
‘new’ to the market only. Overall, they faced more intense competition from foreign entrants than 
domestic SOEs during the sample period. These private firms had a rather balanced focus on R&D 
and commercial exploitation with an average spending of 21 per cent of total annual sales on each 
type of activity. They actively engaged in exporting activities, which brought about 18 per cent of 
their annual sales. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Insert Tables 1 and 2 and Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Analytical Approach 
We adopted a multilevel mixed linear model to address unobserved heterogeneity in the impact of 
foreign and domestic competition on the innovation performance of domestic private HTNVs due to 
the cross-province and cross-industry nature of our dataset. This mixed model allows us to take 
account of the fact that our dataset has a hierarchical structure in which individual firms represent 
level one, provinces represent level two and industries represent level three. In doing so, we are able 
to control for clustering of the data first within an industry and second within a province. To 
determine whether the choice of multilevel modelling with province and industry effects is 
appropriate, we performed a variance analysis. First, we conducted a one-way analysis of variance. 
The results show significant differences in the proportion of intra-group variance among firms in 
different provinces and industries (p<0.001). Second, we found that the residual variances at levels 
two and three in the random intercept model with all variables are statistically significant (p<0.01), 
which justifies the use of multilevel modelling.   
 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 presents the results from our regression analysis of new venture innovation performance. 
Models 1 and 2 contain firm and industry level control variables, and subsequent models add the main 
variables (Models 3, 4, and 5). We conducted Wald tests on the significance of the inclusion of the 
independent variables in each model. The results further confirm that the inclusion of these variables 
significantly improves the fit of each model. In terms of variables of interest, we find a U-shaped 
relationship between foreign competition and private new ventures’ innovation performance measured 
by new product sales. The result from Model 5 suggests that the innovation performance of private 
new ventures is negatively related to the linear term of foreign competition (-0.323, p<0.01), but 
positively related to its squared term (0.013, p<0.01). A test of the joint significance of linear and 
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squared terms of foreign competition is statistically significant, providing strong support for 
Hypothesis 1. The U-shaped effect of foreign competition on private firms’ innovation performance is 
shown in Figure 2 with 95 per cent confidence intervals. Figure 2 shows that higher innovation 
performance gains from increased foreign competition may be realized after the percentage of new 
product sales plunges to its lowest level, as indicated by the inflection point of 23.7 per cent of new 
product sales, at 11.8 level of foreign competition. In other words, when the level of foreign 
competition is greater than 11.8, its positive effects overtake its negative effects on private firms’ 
innovation performance. Our sample mean of foreign competition (12.6) is located to the right of the 
minimum point (Figure 2) of 11.8, suggesting that most observations of foreign competition in our 
sample had a positive effect on private firms’ innovation performance. In line with Hypothesis 2, we 
also find a significant and positive relationship between SOE competition and a private firm’s 
innovation (0.008, p<0.001) in Model 5 (Table 3), suggesting that increasing competition from SOEs 
has a significant and positive impact on private high-tech new ventures’ innovation performance.   
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
To investigate the economic significance of our estimates, we calculated Cohen’s ƒ2 values 
for each type of competition in Model 5. Cohen’s ƒ2 is the most commonly used, very informative, 
and standardized measure of effect size for analyses such as multilevel/hierarchical linear modelling 
and mixed-effects regression modelling (Selya et al., 2012). Our results show that SOE competition 
(ƒ2 = 0.035) has a slightly greater impact on private high-tech new venture’s innovation performance 
than foreign competition (ƒ2 = 0.03) although both have moderate effect sizes which fall between the 
conventional cut-off points of small (ƒ2 = 0.02) and medium (ƒ2 = 0.15) effect sizes recommended by 
Cohen (1988). These results confirm that the impacts of each type of competition on private firms’ 
innovation performance have both statistical and economic significance.  
 
 
Robustness Checks 
 25 
 
To verify the robustness of our results, we conducted several sensitivity analyses. First, we re-
estimated our models using a generalized linear latent and mixed model (GLM). The results from the 
analysis show very similar patterns - the significance level and the direction of the coefficient of each 
independent variable are consistent with our results. Second, in order to minimize the potential 
multicollinearity, we mean centred the independent variables (Aiken & West, 1991).We also 
examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs) of each model after our regression analysis. All of the 
VIF scores are below 10, the commonly used rule of thumb for multicollinearity. Thus, our analyses 
are unlikely to have a serious problem with multicollinearity (Cohen et al., 2003). Third, we 
performed two separate estimations of our models by lagging the dependent variables for one year 
only and using the current values of all variables. Consistent results were obtained across our analysis 
of these different lag variables and lag periods (t and t-1). Finally, to check for the influential points, 
we calculated the Cook’s distance for each observation. The largest Cook’s distance value is 0.04 
which is less than the conventional cut-off value of 1. Thus, the influence of this point is not great 
enough to be a concern.  
----------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------------- 
 
Supplemental Analysis 
Competition from foreign rivals may challenge the leadership position of SOEs through market-based 
forces as the entry of foreign firms, to a great extent, may reduce the degree of market distortion 
caused by indirect government intervention. Equally, increased SOE competition slows down the 
process of economic transition and constrains the rational flow of resources and the market (Bai et al., 
2006). In this regard, the monopoly of restricted state resources by SOEs alleviates the resource 
dependence of foreign firms on private new ventures because of scarce resources. In particular, those 
strategic resources important for local operations needed by both types of firms, are not in each 
other’s control. Thus it is likely that the effect of SOE/foreign competition may overwhelm that of the 
other. To address this temporal aspect (Jia & Mayer, 2017), we performed a supplemental test.  
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As APPENDIX A shows, the coefficient of the interaction term with the linear effect of 
foreign competition is significant and positive (0.062, p<0.05). The coefficient of the interaction term 
with the quadratic effect of foreign competition is significant and negative (-0.002, p<0.05). Our 
additional analysis suggests that SOE competition counteracts the impact of foreign competition on 
private new ventures’ innovation performance. Thus, a low level of SOE competition amplifies the U-
shaped relationship between foreign competition and private firms’ innovation performance, whereas 
a high level of SOE competition dampens this relationship. To illustrate this interaction effect, we 
plotted the significant results obtained in APPENDIX A and their 95 per cent confidence intervals in 
APPENDIX B. APPENDIX B shows the steeper upslope and downslope of the U-shaped curve for 
SOE competition at a sample minimum level of 7.2 vs the flatter upslope and downslope of the U-
shaped for SOE competition at a sample maximum level of 14.7. This is consistent with our 
prediction that with increasing SOE competition, both the negative and positive effects of foreign 
competition are weakened. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
This paper systematically examines the extent to which private new ventures’ innovation performance 
is affected by foreign and SOE competition in a transition economy. Our results suggest that the 
relationship between competition and innovation is not universal but is subject to the level and source 
of competition, which determines the resource dependence of the focal firm and its competitors. The 
dynamics of such relationships are made further evident by a curvilinear U-shaped relationship 
between foreign competition and the innovation performance of private HTNVs. While the findings 
are consistent with the previous literature which suggests that the entry of foreign firms represents an 
opportunity for private HTNVs to learn from these firms (Liu & Wang, 2003; Wei & Liu, 2006; 
Zhang et al., 2010), our detailed analysis also shows that the innovation performance of private 
HTNVs varies with the degree of foreign competition: private HTNVs can undercut foreign 
competition through learning to move up the ladder of innovation at moderate levels of foreign 
competition, but there is a trade-off between learning costs and benefits at higher levels foreign 
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competition and a lack of imitation choices at a low level of foreign competition.  In contrast, we find 
that SOE competition has a positive association with local private firms’ innovation performance. 
This finding may reflect the fact that private firms consider innovation as a strategic means of 
balancing their resource dependence on SOEs. It represents a viable way through which private firms 
outcompete SOEs by enhancing the efficiency of their resource usage and/or capitalizing on emerging 
technological areas within the same sector where SOEs also compete.  
 
Contributions to the Literature on International Business 
Our study complements existing knowledge on the competition mechanism of the FDI spillovers 
effect on transition economy firms in several distinctive ways. First, our study advances a 
contextually based understanding of foreign competition. Existing theories on FDI spillovers are 
mainly built on the performance gains of local firms from the presence of foreign players in general 
(Altomonte & Pennings, 2009; Gorg & Strobl, 2001; Haskel et al., 2007). Such a generic treatment of 
‘local firms’ obscures variations in firms’ responses to foreign competition driven by different 
resource dependence logics associated with their specific ownership type and institutional context, 
such as transition economies, where market forces are not fully established and government 
intervention is still prevalent. Private HTNVs operating in such institutional contexts typically have 
greater  flexibility and learning capabilities enabling them to either benefit from or adapt to foreign 
competition, as they are more resilient to constant shocks and changes in the external environment as 
a result of institution transition (Szamosszegi & Kyle, 2011). In addition to the inadequate theoretical 
focus, the empirical analyses these theories rest on are often based on incomplete datasets omitting 
this type of firms, given the difficulty of collecting information on these firms in a transition economy 
setting (Eapen, 2013). Thus, existing studies may either overestimate or underestimate the effect of 
foreign competition without taking account of heterogeneity in local firms. Our study addresses this 
gap by examining the dynamic resource interdependency between private HTNVs and foreign 
entrants at varying levels of foreign competition to specify its impact on the innovation performance 
of Chinese private HTNVs. 
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Second, previous FDI studies fail to make a clear distinction between the impacts of FDI 
and foreign competition on local firms’ productivity or innovation (Aitken & Harrison, 1999; Tian, 
2007; Wei & Liu, 2006). These studies typically consider increased competition accompanied FDI 
entry as an important mechanism to explain the FDI spillover effect on local firms’ productivity 
(Blomström & Kokko, 1998; Chang & Xu, 2008). This mechanism, however, has been rarely tested 
empirically with most FDI studies examining the crude effect of direct foreign ‘input’ such as 
quantity, shares of ownership,  origin and diversity of FDI on the activity of transition economy firms, 
but drawing ambiguous inferences on foreign competition based on their findings (Aitken & Harrison, 
1999;  Chang & Xu, 2008;  Zhang et al., 2010). Our study complements existing FDI studies by 
articulating the ‘competition effect’ of FDI entry, thus providing a more complete picture of  the FDI 
spillover effect by introducing the resource dependence logic of innovation and learning. In particular, 
we are able to underpin the conditions under which foreign competition is beneficial or detrimental to 
private firms’ innovation performance. 
 
Contributions to the Literature on Competition and Innovation 
For the competition and innovation literature, our study reconciles previous positive (Nickell, 1996; 
Buckley et al., 2002; Liu & Buck, 2007) and negative (Schumpeter, 1950; Hinloopen & 
Vandekerckhove, 2009; Chang & Xu, 2008) assertions in the literature on the relationship between 
foreign competition and innovation, by providing theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for a 
curvilinear U-shaped relationship. In contrast to the well-established linear or inverted U-shaped 
relationships between competition and innovation found in existing studies of advanced economies 
(Aghion et al., 2005; De Bondt & Vandekerckhove, 2012; Polder & Veldhuizen, 2012), our study’s 
unique focus on transition economies, and evidence of a curvilinear U-shaped relationship, implicitly 
highlight the importance of external resource environments and learning in shaping the relationship 
between competition and innovation.  
Differentiating competition with foreign firms versus SOEs also enables us to evoke several 
new mechanisms that affect the known mechanisms that drove the inverted U-shape in the 
competition and innovation literature. Aghion et al. (2005) argue that at a high level of competition, if 
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one firm has managed to innovate and escape competition, another firm will, in general, not find it 
worthwhile to catch up due to low post-innovation rent. Our prediction and findings of a constant 
positive effect of SOE competition on private firms’ innovation performance provide both theoretical 
and empirical support for the argument that at high levels of competition the existence of the sunk 
cost of innovation further motivates private firms to engage in innovation activities, which contradicts 
the established negative effect of high competition on innovation (Schumpeter, 1950; Aghion et al., 
2005). Another new mechanism arising from our analysis is that at high levels of SOE competition, 
the pressure to survive outweighs that to thrive, thus the low post-innovating profits are of less 
concern for private firms than the potentially significant profit losses without innovating, which could 
drive these firms into liquidation or bankruptcy. In addition, Aghion et al. (2005) proposed and tested 
the inverted U-shaped relationship in the leading firms, but not for the laggard firms. By contrast, we 
examine the impact of foreign competition on private HTNVs, which are apparently the laggards to 
foreign firms at their initial market entry. Therefore, we fill the gap in extant literature on competition 
and innovation by offering a perspective of laggard firms, and call for more research on this 
underexplored phenomenon.  
 
Contributions to Resource Dependence Theory 
Our study makes three important contributions to the extension and refinements of resource 
dependence theory. First, we are among the first to apply the resource dependence logic to examine 
competition, thus expanding the boundaries of resource dependence theory. While previous studies 
apply resource dependence theory to explain firms’ collaborative behaviour (Li & Atuahene-Gima, 
2002; Xia et al., 2014), we have set out to examine different types of competition through the lens of 
resource dependence theory. In doing so, we shed new light on two important underlying mechanisms 
represented by competition – firms’ external resource constraints or control, and their ability to 
simultaneously minimize their resource dependence and maximize their external resource control (to 
increase their power relative to the competitors) – that affect firms’ innovation. Moreover, we show 
that resource dependence theory can serve as a helpful exploration tool for probing and better 
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understanding how heterogeneity in these two underlying mechanisms associated with different types 
of competition, leads to variations in innovation performance.  
Second, one of the fundamental assumptions of resource dependence theory concerns the role 
of dependencies. However, the government as a widely recognized source of external dependence 
(North, 1990) has not been explored in relation to the source of competition in prior studies (Xia et al., 
2014). Our study shows that the interaction of interdependent organizations and their institutional 
environment is a dynamic and complex process which can affect innovation outcomes. The findings 
reflect the fact that under incomplete economic transition accompanied by a socialist political system, 
the Chinese government still maintains control of the economy through less direct but more strategic 
participation in economic activities (Mirowski & Plehwe, 2009). Our study thus provides a refinement 
of resource dependence theory by elaborating the context within which the mutual dependence and 
power imbalance between SOEs and private new ventures are established and highlights innovation as 
the only way through which private firms can survive SOE competition. 
Finally, we offer a theoretical advancement of resource dependence theory by conceptualizing 
learning derived from foreign competition as an important strategy for private firms to alter the two 
underlying mechanisms – mutual dependence and power imbalance – elucidated by the resource 
dependence theory. This effectively addresses the shortage of studies exploring actions firms can take 
to manage/reduce environmental dependencies other than those originally identified by Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), such as political actions and executive succession. Exploring the scope of this 
learning rationale also enhances the precision of resource dependence theory in predicting firms’ 
innovation activity, because such learning carries less imminent implications for innovation 
performance compared with other strategies designed to reduce dependence and/or increase power, 
such as looking for alternative resources and diversification into other markets which either require no 
innovation or have to involve innovation at the very beginning (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
 
 
Policy Implications  
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Our findings have important policy implications. When thinking about stimulating innovation through 
foreign competition, it is reasonable to assume an overall positive effect, as the negative effect is 
largely overlooked by existing empirical studies. However, it is important to consider the pace at 
which such competition is introduced. Our study suggests that exposure to extensive competition at an 
early stage may encourage private high-tech firms’ innovation activity but hinder their learning from 
foreign rivals. Policy measures should be designed to introduce foreign competition at a relatively 
even or slow pace in high-tech industries. In addition, for some interorganizational activities such as 
innovation to take place, it requires a network of complex links and feedback mechanisms, in 
particular those interorganizational and extraorganizational communication paths, linking the various 
in-house functions and allowing the firm to articulate with both the market and the wider scientific 
and technological community (Rothewell & Zegveld, 1985). This will prolong the period in which 
private firms can catch up and/or even overtake their foreign counterparts in the innovation contest, so 
that these firms are able to benefit from the introduction of such competition before the market 
saturates.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
As in all studies, ours has some limitations which point to future research. First, our analysis is limited 
to high-tech industries in a transition economy. Before being confident about any generalization, more 
studies should be undertaken to generalize our findings to different sectors and institutional contexts, 
specifically those sectors with less government intervention, and economies where the technology gap 
between domestic and foreign firms is negligible. Second, the causal mechanism of the non-linear 
relationship between foreign competition and innovation is obtained at the aggregated level over a 
seven-year period. More in-depth qualitative studies of the process by which private firms interact 
with foreign entrants and respond to their competitive threats are clearly needed in order to explore 
the behaviour foundation and implications of such a relationship. Additionally, a few scholars have 
examined how SMEs in emerging markets, such as India, learnt from large multinational firms, and 
the process was vividly described as ‘learning to dance with gorillas’ or ‘swimming with sharks’ 
(Prashantham & Birkinshaw, 2008; Prashantham & Dhanaraj, 2015). However, foreign competition 
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may also emanate from smaller foreign companies. Thus, a fruitful future research direction would be 
to compare and contrast how foreign firms affect the learning process of domestic SMEs based on 
their size. Third, it is likely that private firms may deliberately overstate their sales generated from 
new products to attract government subsidies, in particular in China where private firms are not 
obliged to disclose any financial information in the public domain, and the enforcement of accounting 
rules and regulations is relatively weak compared to that in advanced economies. However, we are 
unable to identify this incentive from these firms directly, assuming they will not voluntarily self-
disclose their violations of company laws and generally accepted accounting principles. Future 
research should capture innovation performance using measurements alternative to new product sales. 
Fourth, our study is based on data over the period 2001-2007. However, increased development of 
private risk capital in China in recent years has encouraged foreign and local private entrepreneurs to 
seek private equity investment to fund their innovation activities. This is more likely to strengthen the 
positive impact of SOE competition on private firms’ innovation outcome, but may have little 
influence on the negative moderating effect of SOE competition on the relationship between foreign 
competition and private firms’ innovation performance. A possible reason is that even with the 
support of private risk capital, private new ventures are still unable to acquire the critical resources 
controlled by SOEs, which are ‘irreplaceable’ strategic resources owned by the state, such as 
transportation as part of a firm’s distribution network, and utility supply that are necessary for local 
operations. In the case of foreign competition, the availability of private risk capital serves as an 
alternative source of resources for private new ventures to fund either their own innovation activity, or 
the external acquisition of advanced technological and managerial knowledge. This may reduce 
private firms’ resource dependence on their foreign counterparts (Bruton & Ahlstrom, 2003). Future 
research should test this proposition by examining the moderating effect of private risk capital on our 
hypothesized relationship between each type of competition and the innovation performance of 
private new ventures in China. Finally, while our study distinguishes the types of competitors that 
influence private firms’ innovation differently, this difference is likely to reside in the heterogeneity in 
the types of innovation that different competitors trigger private firms to engage in. For instance, 
weaker foreign competition may result in more imitation but less novel innovation by private firms 
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than stronger foreign competition, and vice versa. Given the limitation of our data, we are unable to 
capture the variations in the type of innovation that occurs in the presence of different levels and 
sources of competition. However, we have performed a supplemental analysis using number of 
patents at industry level as an indicator of novel innovation, with the same set of independent 
variables, but estimated at industry level. The results confirm our main findings and are even stronger 
at industry level (APPENDIX C). Future studies should go beyond examining the changes to the 
overall level of innovation by further distinguishing the types of innovation developed by local private 
firms in the face of competition from foreign firms and SOEs.   
 
CONCLUSION 
This study advances our understanding of heterogeneity in the relationship between foreign 
competition, SOE competition and innovation. Based on the resource dependence logics of learning 
and innovation under competition, we are able to unpack the dynamic intricacy of competition and 
innovation across different settings. By examining longitudinal data drawn from a sample of Chinese 
private HTNVs over the 2001-2007 period, our analysis shows that the impact of competition on 
innovation is contextually based, varying with the source of competition, which determines the 
external resource environment faced by each competitor. Specifically, our study suggests a U-shaped 
relationship between foreign competition and innovation performance, and a positive relationship 
between SOE competition and the innovation performance of private HTNVs. Our study highlights 
the importance of differentiating the impact of different types of competition and provides new 
insights into foreign and SOE competition in a transition economy. 
 
NOTES 
1Several commonly adopted learning methods have been revealed by prior studies based on 
qualitative analysis of how learning occurs in local Chinese firms in the presence of foreign entrants 
(Collinson, 2013; Wei et al., 2008; Xie & Wu, 2003; Zhao et al., 2005). For instance, once Chinese 
firms have noted the advanced technologies and equipment used by foreign counterparts, they tend to 
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reverse engineer the technologies. In the case of new business models bought by foreign rivals, 
Chinese companies typically acquire, assess and apply it with modifications according to their local 
market conditions. Another channel is international and domestic industrial trade fairs and 
exhibitions. Local companies often attend such events for the purpose of identifying new business 
models and learning new technological applications and new material utilization (Wei et al., 2008). 
2In doing so, private firms may build their new technologies or products based on ideas or 
rationales inspired by high-end foreign products, and/or the enhancement of existing technologies and 
products introduced by foreign rivals (Kale & Little, 2007). This is evidenced by the fast growing 
‘Shanzai’ phenomena in a number of emerging high-tech industries; for example, in the cell phone 
sector where China has now become a leading global producer by replicating and innovatively 
imitating the technologies of advanced foreign partners (Engels & Hunt, 2010). 
3For example, Wei et al. (2008)’s study found that some Chinese private high-tech companies 
initially acquired the technologies of their foreign partners through the arrangement of OEMs, then 
used the advanced technologies they learned to target the domestic market. Equally, foreign entrants 
are more willing to partner with these private HTNVs to overcome their liability of foreignness and 
establish an effective local presence as well as to reduce potential local competition (Chang & Xu, 
2008; Nachum, 2010). Williamson and Yin (2014) have noted that two Chinese firms partnering with 
a foreign high-tech start-up have gained access to its advanced technology and in turn they helped the 
foreign company to tap into the Chinese market. 
4This is evidenced by their joint R&D projects with foreign firms through which local firms 
can receive direct training from foreign firms or have close interaction with them via formal and 
informal meetings as a way of acquiring needed advanced technologies (Zhao et al., 2005; Wei et al., 
2008). Similarly, Collinson (2013) characterizes Chinese firms’ cumulative learning as a process from 
learning disembodied knowledge to accumulating value-adding capabilities. This process involves 
training and mentoring as well as learning ‘by-doing’ or ‘on-the-job’ through interaction with and/or 
imitation of foreign firms. 
5Yip & Mckern (2016) provide an interesting example that supports our argument here. 
Yuwell has grown from a township and village enterprise into an innovative medium-size company 
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with over 100 patents. This success as its founder stresses, has been largely built on the premise of 
innovation by spotting and serving a new market niche untapped by SOEs via developing new 
medical devices.  
6We used the three-digit standard industrial classification codes of ‘high-tech sectors’ 
published by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. The ‘high-technology’ category as defined by 
the Chinese statistic Year Book includes the following industries: Aircraft and spacecraft; 
Pharmaceuticals; Office, accounting and computing machinery; Radio, TV and communications 
equipment; Medical, precision and optical instruments. The definition derives from the OECD 
definition. 
7The results are not reported due to space constraints, but available upon request. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Log(percentage of NPD sales) 0.19 0.83 1             
2. Log (Innovation efforts)t-1 0.21 0.51 0.13 1            
3. Log (Commercial effort)t-1 0.21 0.5 0.1 0.13 1           
4. Export intensityt-1     0.18 0.8 0.12 -0.02 -0.03 1          
5. Firm aget-1       7.22 2.95 -0.13 -0.07 -0.02 -0.17 1         
6. Capital intensity (Per firm)t-1 101.43 161.8 -0.03 -0.02 0.13 -0.07 0.08 1        
7. Firm Sizet-1  142.97 107.32 0.07 -0.04 0.11 0.03 0.05 -0.05 1       
8. Foreign competitiont-1 12.6 1.58 0 -0.07 -0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 1      
9. SOE competitiont-1             13.42 6.27 0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.04 0 0.01 -0.01 0.07 1     
10. Foreign spillovert-1   0.39 0.2 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.23 0.28 1    
11. Private sector developmentt-1  9.61 2.67 -0.08 -0.1 -0.17 0.08 0.22 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0 0.08 1   
12. The development of market-based 
economyt-1 
9.19 1.19 -0.08 -0.1 -0.14 0.07 0.2 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.38 1  
13. Local government support for 
innvoationt-1 
7.33 3.08 -0.01 -0.1 -0.12 0.07 0.08 -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.22 0.47 1 
 
Note: N=4,830.  t=7.  All positive and negative correlations greater than 0.027 are significant at p<0.05. 
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics by industry 
  Industry 1 
(193 firms) 
Industry 2 
(103 firms) 
Industry 3 
(189 firms) 
Industry 4 
(320 firms) Variable 
  Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Firm level         
Log(percentage of NPD sales) 0.22 0.90 0.24 0.96 0.15 0.72 0.17 0.79 
Log (Innovation efforts)t-1 0.25 0.53 0.30 0.66 0.20 0.52 0.17 0.43 
Log (Commercial effort)t-1 0.24 0.55 0.23 
 
0.55 0.18 0.44 0.19 0.47 
Export intensityt-1     0.15 0.73 0.18 0.78 0.15 0.70 0.23 0.90 
Firm aget-1       7.06 2.94 7.32 2.94 7.55 2.94 7.09 2.94 
Capital intensity (Per firm)t-1 104.10 185.45 109.72 167.10 104.10 162.33 95.54 143.28 
Firm Sizet-1  149.05 108.35 142.49 104.24 138.70 106.16 142.03 108.27 
Industry level         
Foreign competitiont-1 10.93 0.48 11.26 1.03 14.05 1.01 13.24 0.99 
SOE competitiont-1             10.64 2.70 12.50 1.54 17.86 6.79 12.8 6.13 
Foreign spillovert-1   0.22 0.05 0.19 0.09 0.66 0.11 0.41 0.13 
Province level         
Private sector developmentt-1  9.34 2.89 9.52 2.72 9.63 2.64 9.78 2.53 
The development of market-
based economyt-1 9.11 1.22 9.14 1.26 9.20 1.20 9.24 1.14 
Local government support for 
innovationt-1 7.29 3.17 7.23 3.16 7.35 3.07 7.37 3.00 
 
“1” = the pharmaceutical industry;    “2” = the medical, precision and optical instrument industry; 
“3” = the office, accounting and computing machinery industry;   “4” = the radio, TV and communications 
equipment industry. 
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Table 3 Estimate of innovation performance, multi-level random intercept modela 
  Model 1   Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  
Independent variable Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Firm level variables           
Log (Innovation effortst-1) 0.111 *** 0.112 *** 0.102 *** 0.102 *** 0.103 *** 
 (0.016 ) (0.016 ) (0.017 ) (0.017 ) (0.017 ) 
Log (Commercial effortst-1) 0.074 ** 0.067 ** 0.077 ** 0.076 ** 0.077 ** 
 (0.023 ) (0.023 ) (0.024 ) (0.024 ) (0.024 ) 
Export intensityt-1     0.090 *** 0.089 *** 0.086 *** 0.088 *** 0.083 *** 
 (0.010 ) (0.010 ) (0.011 ) (0.011 ) (0.011 ) 
Capital intensity (per firm)t--1    0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
Firm aget-1       -0.018 *** -0.012 *** -0.010 ** -0.001 *** -0.009 ** 
 (0.003 ) (0.003 ) (0.003 ) (0.003 ) (0.003 ) 
Firm sizet-1  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
Province level variables       
Local government support  0.019 *** 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.017 *** 
for innovationt--1  (0.004 ) (0.005 ) (0.005 ) (0.005 ) 
Private sector developmentt--1   -0.038 *** -0.049 *** -0.051 *** -0.052 *** 
  (0.008 ) (0.010 (0.010 ) (0.010 ) 
The development of market-based   0.003 3 0.016 0.015 0.012 
economyt--1     (0.014 ) (0.016 ) (0.016 ) (0.016 ) 
Industry level variables           
Foreign spillovert-1       -0.132 ** -0.198 *** -0.165 *** 
     (0.054 ) (0.061 ) (0.069 ) 
Foreign competitiont-1 (FC)       -0.169 * 0.014 * -0.323 ** 
Hypothesis 1     (0.075 ) (0.007 ) (0.089 ) 
FC  squaredt-1 (FC2)                 0.007 *   0.013 ** 
Hypothesis 1     (0.003 )   (0.004 ) 
SOE competitiont-1 (SC)             0.003 * 0.008 *** 
Hypothesis 2       (0.002 ) (0.002 ) 
FC t-1 x SC t-1                                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
FC2 t-1 x SC t-1                                          
           
        
Number of industry groups     4 4 4 
Number of province groups   31 31 31 31 
Number of obs. 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830 4,830 
AIC 14,300 14,270 12,771 12,772 12,764 
Log likelihood -7,141 -7,123 -6,368 -6,369 -6,364 
df 6 9 12 12 13 
Significance of FCt-1,FC2t-1     8.33 ***   13.85 *** 
Random effect parameters 
(variance)           
Firm level  0.635 *** 0.633 *** 0.630 *** 0.627 *** 
  (0.797 ) (0.796 ) (0.794 ) (0.792 ) 
Province level  0.056 *** 0.050 *** 0.051 *** 0.051 *** 
  (0.237 ) (0.224 ) (0.225 ) (0.226 ) 
Industry level    0.000 *** 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
         (0.000 ) (0.000 ) (0.000 ) 
a All time varying independent variables are lagged by one year.  
† if p<0.10; * if  p<.05;** if  p<.01; *** if  p<0.001. 
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Figure 1 Distribution of SOEs, foreign firms and private HTNVs across each industry from 
2001-2007 in the overall sampling frame 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Direct effect of foreign competition  
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“1” = the pharmaceutical industry;  “2” = the medical, precision and optical instrument industry; 
“3” = the office, accounting and computing machinery industry;  “4” = the radio, TV and 
communications equipment industry. 
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APPENDIX A 
Table A1 Estimate of innovation performance, multi-level random intercept modela 
Independent variable  Coef.   
Firm level variables   
Log (Innovation effortst-1) 0.102 *** 
 (0.017 ) 
Log (Commercial effortst-1) 0.078 ** 
 (0.024 ) 
Export intensityt-1     0.077 *** 
 (0.011 ) 
Capital intensity (per firm)t--1    0.000 *** 
 (0.000 ) 
Firm aget-1       -0.007 ** 
 (0.003 ) 
Firm sizet-1  0.000 
 (0.000 ) 
Province level variables  
Local government support for innovationt--1 0.015 ** 
 (0.005 ) 
Private sector developmentt—1 -0.051 *** 
 (0.010 ) 
The development of market-based economyt--1    0.015 
 (0.016 ) 
Industry level variables   
Foreign spillovert-1   -0.225 *** 
 (0.057 ) 
Foreign competitiont-1 (FC)   -0.895 ** 
Hypothesis 1 (0.345 ) 
FC  squaredt-1 (FC2)             0.036 ** 
Hypothesis 1 (0.013 ) 
SOE competitiont-1 (SC)       0.370 * 
Hypothesis 2 (0.204 ) 
FC t-1 x SC t-1                                 0.062 * 
 (0.031 ) 
FC2 t-1 x SC t-1                                 -0.002 * 
 (0.001 ) 
  
Number of industry groups 4 
Number of province groups 31 
Number of obs. 4,830 
AIC 12,746 
Log likelihood -6,353 
Df 15 
Significance of FCt-1,FC2t-1 27.77 *** 
Random effect parameters (variance)   
Firm level 0.620 *** 
 (0.787 ) 
Province level 0.051 *** 
 (0.226 ) 
Industry level 0.000 *** 
  (0.000 ) 
a All time varying independent variables are lagged by one year.  
† if p<0.10; * if  p<.05;** if  p<.01; *** if  p<0.001. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
             Figure B1 Moderating effects of SOE Competition  
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APPENDIX C 
Table C1 Estimate of novel innovation at industry levela, Poisson model 
Industry level independent variable Coef.   
Log (Innovation effortst-1) 3.146 *** 
 
(0.005 ) 
Log (Commercial effortst-1) -11.455 ** 
 
(0.011 ) 
Export intensityt-1     23.407 *** 
 
(0.034 ) 
Capital intensity (per firm)t--1    0.010 *** 
 
(0.000 ) 
Firm aget-1       0.403 *** 
 
(0.001 ) 
Firm sizet-1  -0.004 
 
 
(0.000 ) 
Local government support for innovationt--1 0.045 *** 
 
(0.000 ) 
Private sector developmentt--1 0.078 *** 
 
(0.001 ) 
The development of market-based economyt--1    0.041 
 
 
(0.001 ) 
Foreign spillovert-1   -0.159 *** 
 
(0.003 ) 
Foreign competitiont-1 (FC)   7.433 *** 
Hypothesis 1 (0.022 ) 
FC  squaredt-1 (FC2)             -0.244 *** 
Hypothesis 1 (0.001 ) 
SOE competitiont-1 (SC)       2.799 *** 
Hypothesis 2 (0.013 ) 
FC t-1 x SC t-1                                 0.513 *** 
 
(0.002 ) 
FC2 t-1 x SC t-1                                 -0.024 *** 
 
(0.000 ) 
Number of obs. 4,830 
 AIC 18.40 
 Log likelihood -45,052.95 
 Df 15
 Significance of FCt-1,FC2t-1 764.92   
a All time varying independent variables are lagged by one year. All independent variables are at industry 
level.  
† if p<0.10; * if  p<.05;** if  p<.01; *** if  p<0.001. 
 
 
